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ROBERT S. SUMMERS

REPLY TO MR MACKIE

I thank Mr John Mackie for his helpful comments. In general, I
accept his summary of my main theses at the beginning of his
comments. I will take up his criticism point by point. In this response, the Arabic numerals correspond to the same sections in Mr
Mackie's comments.
2. I cited the cases of Butterfield v. Forrester and Maki v. Frelk to
illustrate a point. I noted that the court in the second case - the
Illinois Supreme Court in 1968 - followed the so-called rule of
Butterfield v. Forrester that contributory negligence is a complete
bar, even though the latter rule may well be the harshest doctrine
known to the common law. I suggested that one likely explanation
for the Illinois court's adherence to this doctrine was that some of
the judges of the Illinois court may have harbored a working conception of the law as pre-existing rule and have become obsessed
with this notion. Mr Mackie does not deny this possibility, yet it
was the main point of my illustrative use of these cases.
I was not, at this point, using the illustration to show the possible "demerits of a rule conception of law in general." Of course,
it is partly by assembling such particular instances that one might
show such "demerits in general." Mr Mackie says that it is "prejudicial and unfair of [me] to use as [my] one example a bad, excessively simple, old, and largely abandoned rule." I agree that the
rule is bad, but this in fact supports me, for it indicates that something of importance is at stake. I agree that the rule is excessively
simple, but we have many such simple rule formulations in the
books, a state of affairs attributable in part, I believe, to an
excessive rule-mindedness - to over-reliance upon a "rules" working conception. I concede that the so-called rule of Butterfield
v. Forrester is largely abandoned today. Its abandonment by any
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form of legal action has been exceedingly slow, however. Only
four American states abandoned it by judicial action (and no
English court did so). It remains very much alive in some American states. Yet it has been said that we are talking here of the
harshest doctrine known to the common law.
3. Mr Mackie says that he finds some obscurity in my notion of a
working conception. He asks: "Is it a conception of the legal system as a whole, or a conception of the job of a court of law?"
A working conception as I conceive it is neither a conception of
the legal system as a whole nor a full conception of the job of a
court of law. It is a conception a judge holds of some "recurrent
normative phenomena of the law." I repeat the list of features (all
of which may recur in cases for decision) I gave in my paper:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

(g)

pre-existing rules,
actual reasons for those rules,
equities between the parties outside any relevant rules,
discretionary judgment (including that involved in the overruling
or modification of precedent),
the bearing of ideas of justice and the common good characteristically found in some forms of law,
the general dictates of reasons, including "goal" reasons and
"rightness" reasons, relevant to the justification of judicial decisions, and
fiat.

I have singled out a rule conception as a viable judicial working
conception. (It derives partly from the rules feature.) I have singled
out a reason conception in this way, too. I do not claim that there
is a corresponding viable working conception for all features on
this list, however. Note that all phenomena on the list may be
classed as justificatory resources - resources by reference to which
a judge may, as appropriate, decide a case. (Note, too, that I am
not saying that a judge who holds a "rules" working conception
must believe that the whole of the law consists of a fixed body of
pre-existing rules.)
Mr Mackie also refers to a working conception as "the best description of the job of each court in each particular case." But this,
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too, is not my characterization. The best description of the total
job of a judge would include taking into account (appropriately)
all recurrent general phenomena of the law - all justificatory
resources - that bear on the case. In my scheme of thought, a
working conception is a conception of one type of such phenomena considered in some appropriate sense to be primary.
Mr Mackie suggests that a conflict between working conceptions
cannot arise if the rival conceptions are of the legal system as a
whole. In my view, however, a conflict is possible even if the conceptions are of the legal system as a whole. It will not do (as Mr
Mackie seems to try to do) to legislate away any possibility of conflict between working conceptions of the law as a whole by hypothesizing a system in which the only function of courts is to apply rules
made by a legislature duly concerned with reason. I did not, however, pursue this in my original paper, for there I addressrivalworking conceptions of general features of legal phenomena that recur
in cases and bear on the decisional and justificatory tasks ofjudges.
4. Contrary to one of my theses, Mr Mackie says that a working
conception with its narrow focus on some recurrent general
feature of legal phenomena is not a pragmatic necessity for most
judges. He says judges can and should be aware of all recurrent
general phenomena of the law when deciding cases. Now, I do not
deny that a judge can and should be aware of all the various types
of justificatory legal resources that the case involves. I do not
support my pragmatic necessity thesis on the ground that a judge
cannot be aware of all such phenomena. Nor do I (any longer, at
least for now) try to support that thesis on the ground that a judge
can cope with only one kind of recurrent general feature of the
phenomena at a time. (It may be that he could simply take each
feature as it comes, so to speak.)
I will now briefly try to support the pragmatic necessity thesis
with something new, though I confess that I cannot myself get
hold of it very well, and in the end it may not do. There is more to
the story than the illustrative list of recurrent general features of
legal phenomena I have set forth. There is also a problem of the
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relation between these phenomena.I believe the adoption of a
working conception signifies an assignmentof primacy to the
feature involvedin light of such factors as its authoritativeplace
within the system, its intrinsic justificatory significance, the

regularityof its recurrence,and so on. It is not for nothingthat a

judge has a working conception. Such a conception enables him to

cope far more readily(and more efficiently) with the complexity
of the relationsbetween instancesof legal phenomenathat recur
in the cases. It providesa kind of tentative "fix" or orderingof
those relations which he may bring to each case. Thus if he
harborsa rule conception this signifiesthat he accordsa kind of
provisionalprimacyto rulesasjustificatoryresourcescomparedto
the other recurrentgeneralphenomenaof law. He assumesthat
this fix or orderingserveshim well. It may even seem to "decide"
a high proportionof casesfor him. A judge without any such (rule
or other) workingconception is left to work out this matter of
primacyad hoc in each case. Of course, for the above-averageor
unusuallygiftedjudge, this may not prove a difficult matter.But
for many judges it may not be too much to say that a working
conceptionis, on the foregoingground,a pragmaticnecessity.This
is all I now haveto offer to supportthe pragmaticnecessitythesis,
and I agreethat the mattercallsfor furtherexploration.
But let us suppose I am wrong that a workingconception is a
pragmaticnecessity for most judges. If my interpretationof the
evidence is correct, it nonethelessremainstrue that manyjudges
do in fact approachthe decision of cases with a workingconception in mind. If this be so, then it remainsimportantto inquire
into the nature of these conceptions and into whether there are
grounds for preferringany one possibility (includingones I have
not consideredhere).
Note that judicial reliance on working conceptions might be
explained on a varietyof bases:the simpletruththat certaintypes
of justificatory legal phenomenatend to be more recurrentthan
others; the normative predominanceof some phenomena over
others; deep psychologicalleanings,e.g., the desirefor the certainty that rules seem to bring,etc. Note that MrMackieassumesthat
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on my account of the matter only one feature of relevant legal
phenomena is ever brought into focus - that embodied in the working conception. But I stated in my paper that this is not so. The
feature that the working conception brings into focus may be dispositive of the case, but then it may not be, too. And the judge
may end up focusing on other justificatory phenomena. Thus I am
not saying we must ultimately choose between a system of rules
and a system of reason. I am saying there are different possible
working conceptions and that one may be preferable to others.
5. Mr Mackie thinks that if I opt for his proposed interpretation
of my allegedly ambiguous claims, namely, that a working conception must be addressed not to the legal system as a whole but to a
feature of recurrent legal phenomena from the point of view of a
particular court, then this interpretation will fail, as he puts it, to
fit other parts of my text. His proposed interpretation is in fact
the one I intend. And my text is not inconsistent.
In another part of my text I contended that a working conception of the law as reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations meets one of the criteria for a viable working conception,
namely that its scope and potential applicability to particularcases
is sufficient. I went on to say that this conception may even be the
most wide-ranging of candidates. But I fail to see how this is
inconsistent with construing my working conception as addressed
to a feature of recurrent legal phenomena from the point of view
of a court in particular cases. On the contrary, if some degree of
reasoned reconciliation were not a sufficiently common feature of
the materials that judges confront from case to case, it could
hardly serve as a viable working conception. Thus when I say that
the reason conception is wide-ranging, I do not mean that it is
actually a conception of the system as a whole. I am, for one thing,
saying that it ranges over - is applicable in some way to - other
recurrent features of legal phenomena relevant in cases for
decision. For example, it figures in rules and exceptions thereto. It
figures in exercises of discretion. It figures in the formulation and
application of equitable ideas, and so on.
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A reason conception is wide-rangingin a further yet related way
without being what Mr Mackie calls a conception of the system as
a whole. Unforeseen considerations are always cropping up in particular cases. On the reason conception, the judge is a kind of
sentry whose duty it is to "be there" to take appropriate account
of such considerations.
A reason conception is wide-ranging in the still further sense
that it ranges over highly varied institutional, processual, and other
sociological structures of the [aw. This, too, is not to be equated
with a conception of the system as a whole.
Finally, a reason conception is wide-ranging in the sense that it
is not confined to the law's experience with any narrow class of
social relations.
6. Under the heading of "ComparativeServiceability," I argued in
favor of a reason over a rule working conception on the ground
that the reason conception is more congenial to a rationale-oriented
method of interpreting legal materials. I do not stop to go into the
complexities of interpretation, but Mr Mackie, unlike a great many
English and American judges of the past, agrees with me that a
reason conception is more congenial in this way. But he says if 1
allow that a rule conception may also include the reasons for the
rules then there is really no ground here for choosing the reason
conception over this (more sophisticated) rule conception, and he
notes that I acknowledge that one rival in the field is in fact a
"rule with reasons" working conception.
To this I have two responses. First, I believe that a significant
proportion of judges who appear to harbor a rules working conception simply do not incorporate into their conception the
actual reasons for the rules as well. Thus, in regardto such judges,
the difference between the two conceptions, and my ground for
preferringthe reason conception, remain real.
Second, it is not clear to me that if a rule conception also incorporates the actual reasons for those rules, then the reason conception and the rule conception must necessarily collapse into one
another (in this respect). For example, a judge who works with a
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"rule with its reasons" conception may believe that, if the evidence
as to reasons is ambivalent (as it not uncommonly is), he may
either fall back on the merely literal import of the language of
the materials or may regard himself free simply to substitute his
own personal views. On the other hand, neither of these possibilities follows from harboring a reason conception as such.
Moreover, there is, beyond ambivalence of actual reasons, a
further matter. A rule plus its actual reasons even when not ambivalent is still not to be equated with a reason conception. The possible
available reasons may go beyond or be different from those
embodied in the rule or "attached" thereto. On the reason conception, the judge would be more readily led to these and thus be
more inclined to discard the rule (rather than adhere to it, as in
Maki v. Frelk). Or there might be new and better reasons for the
rule than its original ones. On a reason conception, the judge
would more readily resort to these (as he should). Not only would
this be likely to lead him to uphold the rule; it might also enable
him to interpret and apply it better, in light of these new and
better reasons.
I argued in my original paper in favor of a working conception
of the law as a reasoned reconciliation of conflicting considerations
on two further grounds: (1) much pre-existing law does not consist of rules; and (2) often there is no relevant pre-existing law so
that it must be made up in light of reason as we go along. Now, Mr
Mackie says that these two grounds "seem incompatible." He seems
to assume that if I allow for any general type of pre-existing nonrule law, this may somehow commit me to the proposition that all
the law pre-exists for all possible cases, and that therefore there
cannot be any genuinely new issues, any actual "cases of first impression" (as lawyers say), or the like.
But I do not see why this should be so. Let me take merely one
type of example familiar to lawyers. Case law as well as statute law
sometimes confers broad discretion to be exercised by judges on a
case-by-case basis in light of criteria at least partially specified. I
call this non-rule law, although specific rules may over time
emerge from some of the exercises of discretion. Yet even within
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the fields that such non-rule law addresses, relatively novel issues
may arise for which, in my view, this non-rule law provides no
determinate solutions. But for my point to hold, it is enough that
such issues may arise outside these fields, too.
I think I know what influences Mr Mackie here. A contemporary
legal philosopher known to him (and to me) has ably contended
that there are forms of non-rule law that "occupy the whole" and
thus predetermine (and uniquely so) very nearly all questions. But
it is enough for my purposes to note that there are various forms
of non-rule law, some of which are not of this allegedly all-encompassing character.
The contemporary legal philosopher to whom Mr Mackie alludes
sees the law as almost wholly pre-existing (and uniquely determinative at that). Mr Mackie takes me to task for not addressing
this view as a possible working conception. In defense, let me say
this. My own topic grew out of my work with judges in "continuing judicial education seminars," as they are called in America.
At no time, in a substantial number of those seminars, did I ever
encounter a judge who appeared to hold as a working conception
the view that for almost every issue that arises there is almost
always controlling pre-existing law, and law that provides a single
right answer at that. At the same time, it is a rarejudge who holds
that judges do not and ought not to make any law. Even the most
conservative judges readily recognize that they some-imes must
and do make law; for law may have to be remade because originally
in error or now obsolete, law may be conflicting and thus call for
choice, issues of first impression arise, and so on. On the other
hand, I have in those seminars met many judges who, it seemed
to me, hold one or the other of the two basic working conceptions I address in my paper. Of course, I concede that the best
working conception for the usual judge might be something different from either of these. I really only wanted to consider these
two widely held ones (if I am right on my facts). I suspect, too,
that the contemporary legal philosopher to whom Mr Mackie
alludes would not be happy to have his stimulating and instructive
theory downgraded to the status of a mere working conception.
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(I add, for the record,that my conception of "goalreasons"is
not to be equatedwith "publicpolicy reasons"and thus my "goal
reasons"arenot severelyrestrictedin theirscopein the way "policy

reasons" may be.)

7. Under the head of "normative side effects" I set out to explore
what some of the side effects of harboring one working conception rather than another might be, and to consider whether one is
preferable to the other on this score. I suggested that rule-minded
judges will tend to go in for rules as such and that reason-minded
judges will tend to go in for reason as such. I tried to put the
general case for the importance of rules as strongly as I could and I
tried to do the same for the importance of reason.
Mr Mackie says that in this part of my paper I put the cart
before the horse. He says that "Prior to the question 'What working conception will be best for the judges to have?' is the question 'What sort of a legal system do we want to have?"' Now I am
not sure what, if anything, is at stake here. I agree with Mr Mackie
on the priority question. But I do not see how it would follow
from this that I have put the cart before the horse. My topic is
working conceptions of "the law," and in the course of treating
it, I have (partially) addressed Mr Mackie's prior question.
Now we turn to more substantive matters, but still under the
heading of the comparative value of the rule conception and the
reason conception in light of what I call normative side effects.
First, there is a point of some importance on which Mr Mackie
appears to have misunderstood me, though this may be my fault.
He suggests that I advocate a system in which the law consists
largely of ad hoc reasoned reconciliations by particular courts with
few or no rules. But I do not say this. What I do say is that if
judges generally harbor a reason conception, this is likely to bring
more reason into the law's content than would be the case if
judges generally harbor a rule conception. Judges working with a
reason

conception

would,

among other things, be constantly

looking for opportunities to bring substantive reasons to bear both
within and beyond the province of pre-existing rules. This would
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be one general ground for preferring a reason conception. But in
saying this I am not committed to favoring a system of law that
consists solely of ad hoc reasoned reconciliations of particular
courts. Nor does it follow that a reason conception carried to its
logical end would give us a system of law consisting solely of ad
hoc single-instance reconciliations. It just is the reasonable thing,
for example, to have some rules, and reason will show us that too.
Second, there is a further and related point of some importance
on which Mr Mackie seems to have misunderstood me, though
again this may be my fault. He suggests that I think "the best way
to get reasoned content into the law as a whole is to encourage
particular courts to work mainly by explicitly trying to reconcile
conflicting considerations for themselves." Again, I did not say
this. I said we are likely to get more substantive reason out of a
reason conception than out of a rule conception as such. I speak
here only of working conceptions. A working conception (used
rationally) leaves a place for all the phenomena of the law, including rules.
Third, let me say straightaway, however, that if I were faced
with the false choice between what Mr Mackie calls a system consisting "largely of fairly stable rules" on the one hand, and a system consisting "largely of ad hoc reasoned reconciliation by particular courts" on the other hand, I would, without knowing more,
be inclined to opt for the latter. Fairly stable rules may be utterly
devoid of rightness and goodness. It is, I think, somewhat more
implausible to suppose that ad hoc reasoned reconciliations by
particular courts may be similarly devoid of rightness and goodness. Let us not assume that everyone is morally haywire. Let us
take Anglo-American societies. One (but not the only) argument
for my position here would be that, in such a society with a legal
system consisting of ad hoc reasoned resolutions, each decision
would have to be publicly justified on its own terms. Comparable
problems governed by rule would all be settled in advance in one
relatively short rule-creative moment. Such "rule" law would thus
not be continuously tested case after case. Yet we know that,
among other things, law becomes obsolete as social conditions
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change. Processes of ad hoc reasoned reconciliation stand ready to
take account of such factors. Furthermore, a bad ad hoc decision
is confined in its effect to the parties at hand; not so, a rule. But
of course, as I have said before, no choice is required between a
system obsessed with rules and one obsessed with reason. I have
pursued this merely because Mr Mackie seems quite certain that, as
between the two, a "rule" system would be preferable.
Fourth, I suspect Mr Mackie and I do differ in ouriperceptions
of the need to improve the quality of substantive law through the
injection of reason (by whatever means). He suggests I would be
hard pressed to find very many examples of bad law (whether in
rule form or other). He notes twice in his comments that I cite
only one example of bad law and notes that I admit that even that
one is now being overhauled. Without undertaking the tedious task
of citing chapter and verse, let me assure him that at least in
America the law is not so well off as all that. This is not to say
that very much of it is now evil (though that, too, was so only a
very few years ago). It is to say that, through reason, there is considerable scope, in America at least, for the improvement of the
substantive law.
8. Mr Mackie says it would "be better to ensure, as far as possible,
that judges do not become obsessed with any working conception,
than to speculate about which conception, if they do become obsessed with it, will do less harm." With this much I agree. But it
does not follow that it is of no importance so to speculate. If I am
right, judges do become obsessed with their working conceptions
(I note that philosophers write about rule worship). It is not
evident to me that the consequences of these obsessions may not
vary significantly, depending on the conception involved. I know
of no way to prevent obsessions, but it may be possible to induce
judges to opt for the working conception that causes the least
havoc when it is known that some proportion of judges will
become preoccupied with whatever working conception they
happen to hold.
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In conclusion, I want to address briefly an important assumption I
find running through Mr Mackie's comments. The theme is that in
the best justified division of legal labor in a modern system of law,
rules are to be made and changed largely by the legislature and
only occasionally (and then only "perhaps") by the highest courts.
If this be assumed, then what Mr Mackie says against my position
in his Section 7 may be somewhat more plausible. But again I am
not ready to grant Mr Mackie his assumption about the best division of legal labor. First, there is always genuine scope for common law. (Where, incidentally, did it come from?) Many lawyers,
liberal and conservative, would even agree that some kinds of matters are better left to judges than to legislatures. It strikes me as far
from obvious that the work of legislatures is generally well reasoned
and defensible, or even that it is regularly better in quality than
law made by judges. Moreover, I do not see why all judge-made
law must be viewed as undemocratic. Second, I have always found
it difficult to understand why in recent times there should have
been, in the English system, such unwillingness to overrule precedent. The common law is not always sound when made. I do not
think Butterfield v. Forrester was rightly decided at the time.
Moreover, change takes its toll even on common law which was
sound when made. Why should not the courts have responsibility
for some - perhaps most - genuine common law renovation that

does not pose controversial issues on which political parties divide
(and that would otherwise be appropriate)? And would the House
of Lords be able to do a better job in such cases if it had before it
arguments pro and con from the courts below? Of course, there
are many complexities here, and I have been able to touch on only
a few of them.
Cornell Law School

